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This article studies the production of synthetic fuels in Spain under the dictatorship of 
General Franco. The Spanish synthetic fuels experiment was carried out by a state-
owned firm which was endowed with huge financial and commercial privileges. The 
technological support for the project was to come from the German firm I.G. Farben. 
After the Nazi defeat, it suffered cutbacks and delays. The factory only reached normal 
levels of production in 1957, when the restrictions which had justified the project had 
desappeared. This study contends that the coincidence of state ownership and the 
absence of democratic controls may encourage economic adventurism and have 
serious consequences for a country's economic development. 
 
 
 The production of synthetic fuels was one of the great technological 
challenges of the twentieth century. Faced with the lack of any domestic 
reserves of oil, or the depletion of the existing supplies, governments of several 
countries funded research into the area. In spite of their efforts, synthetic fuels 
have always proved more expensive to produce than crude oil. Indeed, most of 
the attempts to promote the commercial production of synthetic fuels were 
made in exceptional circumstances and under intense state protection: for 
instance, in Nazi Germany, in the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s, and in South 
Africa during the years of the international trade embargo1.  
 
The case of Spain was similar, although it had certain distinctive 
characteristics of its own. The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 was followed by 
the dictatorship of General Franco, which sided unequivocally with the Axis 
powers. The United States and Great Britain retaliated by imposing an embargo 
on the sale of petroleum products to Spain, which meant a dramatic reduction 
in the country’s consumption. The regime’s response was to launch a project 
for a series of power plants to produce synthetic fuels, using brown coals and 
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oil shale as raw materials. The technological support for the project was to 
come from the German firm I.G. Farben. The project suffered cutbacks and 
delays. The only plant that actually became operative – Puertollano (Ciudad 
Real) – began production in 1956, when Spain was no longer under the 
international trade embargo. Production continued for ten years under the 
protection of the government, which passed on the high production costs to the 
consumer. Eventually the situation became untenable; the installations for the 
treatment of shale were closed, and a conventional crude oil refinery was built 
in their place.  
 
The Spanish synthetic fuel experiment differed from those conducted in 
other countries in that it was carried out by a firm, named ENCASO, which was 
part of the INI (the National Institute of Industry), the large, publicly-owned 
industrial holding set up by the regime to implement its policy of autarky. This 
study contends that the involvement of a publicly-owned company and the non-
democratic nature of Franco’s regime made it possible to set the project in 
motion at a time when the external circumstances no longer justified it, and that 
the project continued even when the regime had abandoned its policy of self-
sufficiency.  
 
This article is divided into four sections. The first analyses the 
technological and economic context in which the Spanish project came into 
being and examines its technological links with Nazi Germany. The second 
section studies the difficulties that the plan had to overcome before the plant 
began to function, and the technological options chosen. The third section 
analyses the economic costs of the project and the formulas established to 
fund it. The last part summarizes the study’s main conclusions.  
 
1. Synthetic fuels in Spain after the Civil War: a symbol of the policy of 
autarky 
 
The possibility of obtaining products similar to those derived from 
petroleum (gasoline, diesel oil, fueloil, and lubricants) through treating various 
types of coals, or oil shale or tar sands, began to emerge in Germany around 
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1910. In the 1920s Friedrich Bergius devised a procedure based on the 
hydrogenation of coal at certain pressures and temperatures. The patent was 
acquired by BASF in 1925, a few months before the firm became part of the 
new firm I.G. Farben. I.G. Farben perfected the process, in particular by 
dividing it into two phases, and set up the first commercial production plant in 
Leuna2. Around the same time, Franz Fischer and Hans Tropsch developed 
another process based on the synthesis of carbon monoxide and hydrogen. 
The patent was acquired in 1934 by Ruhrchemie AG, a company controlled by 
the great coal producers.  
 
The production of synthetic fuels were commercially viable only because 
of the policy of import substitution applied by successive German governments. 
In 1930 tariffs on the import of petroleum products were increased substantially 
and, later on, the use and consumption of these products were closely 
supervised by the State. After 1933 the Nazi government intensified the policy, 
signing agreements with a number of companies, among them I.G. Farben, 
which guaranteed the purchase of synthetic fuels at attractive prices. By 1944 
there were twelve hydrogenation plants in Germany, and nine more using 
Fischer-Tropsch technology. In that year these plants provided 90 percent of 
Germany’s aviation gasoline, 35 percent of its common gasoline and almost 40 
percent of its diesel oil3.  
 
 The success of the German techniques caught the attention of countries 
which had no petroleum of their own. The dependence on outside sources of 
petroleum products was particularly dangerous in the unstable political scenario 
of inter-war Europe. In Spain, the matter was of great concern to the  Army,  
which published the new technological advances in its  journals, and 
commissioned statistical studies and quality tests4.  
 
Prior to the Civil War, Spain had only one plant that produced fuels using 
domestic raw materials. It was a small shale distillation plant in Puertollano, in 
the province of Ciudad Real, belonging to the French company Peñarroya, 
which also held the rights to many of the mineral deposits in the area. The 
procedure used was pyrolysis, heat treatment in vertical Pumpherston retorts. 
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The plant treated some 68 000 tonnes per year, and obtained 8 700 t. of oils 
and sulfates. Refining provided around 4 million liters of gasoline, 400 000 liters 
of lubricants and 1 300 t. of asphalts, among other less important subproducts5.  
 
In 1934, under the Second Republic, Samper’s Conservative 
government announced a competition for grants to Spanish fuel manufacturers 
using domestic raw materials. Seven applications were received, two of them 
proposing the use of shales as raw material and the other five  based on the 
processing of brown coals from the Aragon basin in Teruel and Zaragoza. The 
most ambitious project was the one presented by Peñarroya, which  offered to 
expand its plant in Puertollano to reach a production capacity of 350 000 t. per 
year. All the applications, however, were based on traditional distillation 
procedures without hydrogenation or synthesis of the oils obtained. The 
outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936 put an end to these plans, but the regime 
that emerged victorious was to play a much more decisive role in the sector6. 
 
The political and social groups that supported Franco in his uprising 
against the Republic did not have a common, well-defined set of economic 
ideas. For the industrialists of the bourgeoisie, the role of the State was merely 
to ensure the subjugation of the workers and to safeguard the tariffs; it should 
not become involved in the processes of production. However, among the 
groups with Fascist tendencies, and especially among the military, there was a 
deep mistrust of the free market in general and of private business in particular. 
These groups felt that the lack of a business culture was one of the reasons for 
the country’s economic backwardness and that the State should compensate 
by intervening wholeheartedly in the productive sphere. They also believed that 
Spain should be self-sufficient in as many areas of production as possible. 
From these two basic ideas emerged the Instituto National de Industria (INI) in 
1941, a public entity with the mission of creating state-financed firms to operate 
in sectors considered strategically important. The founder and first president of 
the INI was Juan A. Suanzes, a military engineer and personal friend of Franco, 
with wide business experience in the naval construction sector7.  
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 The production of synthetic fuels was one of these strategic sectors. 
Since the outbreak of the Second World War, the Spanish government, in spite 
of its declaration of non-belligerence, made no secret of its support for the Axis 
powers. This support found expression in the sale of strategic materials to 
Germany, in particular  tungsten. In retaliation, the United States and Great 
Britain imposed strict control on Spanish imports of petroleum products. The 
authorizations for the purchase of these products tightened, or eased, 
according to the position of the Spanish government in its policy of friendship 
towards Germany and Italy. In 1942, the gross consumption of petroleum was 
around half the 1935 figure. Drastic rationing of domestic sales was necessary, 
and many automobiles adopted converters so as to be able to use coals or 
other solid fuels instead of gasoline or diesel oil8. In these circumstances the 
interest of the authorities in any option that promised to improve domestic 
production is totally understandable.  
 
This problem was one of the first that the INI sought to solve. Indeed, an 
official commission to study domestic fuel production had been set up as early 
as 1938 by Suanzes, then minister of industry. The commission gathered 
information on all the possible technological alternatives including 
hydrogenation and synthesis of coals and shales. The INI was officially created 
in September 1941, and Suanzes was appointed its first president. Only a few 
weeks later, in January 1942, the INI presented the government with its projects 
for the synthetic production of fuels9.  
 
 The first point defended by the INI was that no private initiatives should 
be allowed: the production of synthetic fuels should be the exclusive preserve 
of the INI itself, as the agent of the State: “Given the great interest, both 
economic and military, of the exploitation of the shales of Puertollano and in 
light of the other special circumstances of the case under study, [the INI] 
considers that this exploitation should be conducted by a company over which 
the State, that is to say, the INI created for such purposes, has absolute 
control”10. The government accepted this view. In the following months it drew 
up a series of provisions that assigned exclusive responsibility for creating firms 
to produce fuels to the INI and suspended the concession of new mining 
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exploitations for both oil shale and brown coals11. As the culmination of this 
process, in November 1942, the INI created ENCASO, 'Empresa Nacional 
"Calvo Sotelo" de Combustibles Líquidos y Lubricantes12. The INI was the sole 
shareholder. Some of the private companies which had presented proposals in 
the 1934 competition were still interested in participating, but their proposals 
were all rejected by the  government. In this area, as in others, the new regime 
saw State intervention not as subsidiary to private enterprise but as a 
substitution of it.   
   
As Franco’s government maintained close links with the Nazi regime, the 
INI sought German technological support for the project. In 1943, after a series 
of visits and preliminary studies, Mineralölbau GmbH were contracted to 
oversee the management of the project; eight Spülgas furnaces for the 
distillation of shale were ordered from the Lurgi company, and smaller-scale 
equipment from other German companies. The shale treatments designed by 
Edeleanu GmbH and I.G. Farben were studied and tested, but eventually no 
contracts were signed with these firms13.  
 
Around the same time, the directors of ENCASO produced a general 
report on the manufacture of synthetic fuels, which they presented to the 
government14. The company intended to develop four different projects; a 
conventional refinery in the port of Cartagena and three synthetic fuel plants. 
Two of these plants, in the mining areas of Teruel near Zaragoza and in 
Puentes de García Rodríguez in La Coruña, Galicia, would use brown coals as 
raw material; the other, in Puertollano (140 miles south of Madrid), would use 
shale. The Puertollano project was the most detailed of the four. In the report a 
number of alternatives were presented; after considering the costs and the 
types of product that would be obtained, hydrogenation with the Bergius system 
was recommended.  
 
The government accepted the firm’s proposal, which became law on 24 
May 1944. The  project would be carried out in two phases. In the first (1944-
47) the shale treatment plant was to be built in Puertollano, along with a plant 
for the production of nitrogenous fertilizers; two thermoelectric power stations 
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would be constructed in Teruel and Puentes de García Rodríguez, and the 
petroleum refinery would be built in Cartagena. Pilot plants were also to be built 
for the treatment of brown coals, but the construction of the final plants would 
be left for the second phase15.   
 
 For the Spain of  those years, the project as a whole was extraordinarily 
ambitious. The total investment for the four projects amounted to almost 2 bn 
pesetas (about $150 million at the time), a figure surpassed by only two 
Spanish companies: Telefónica, the telephone monopoly, and RENFE, the 
state-owned railways. The Puertollano project, with an investment of 600 million 
pesetas ($45 million), was among the five largest in Spanish industry16.  
 
 The report acknowledged that the production of synthetic fuels would be 
more expensive than the refining of crude petroleum. The justification was the 
alleged need for guaranteeing provision of products that were considered 
strategic. ENCASO believed that the company could be profitable if it were 
assigned some of the revenue from the taxes on fuels. In normal market 
conditions, the predicted losses would be around 12 million pesetas (about $1 
million) per year17. 
 
 The synthetic fuels project was the most emblematic of the Franco 
regime’s period of autarky. Until 1955 ENCASO was the largest company in the 
INI, accumulating almost 30 percent of total investment. It also represented 
Franco’s political will (and that of his government) to attain the highest possible 
levels of self-sufficiency, regardless of economic considerations. But the project 
was formulated to meet a particular set of circumstances; by the time it was 
implemented those circumstances had changed completely. The fact that it was 
implemented at all is testimony to the autarkic, isolationist mentality of the 
regime.  
 
 
2. An obsolete project comes to fruition 
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 The plan for the production of synthetic fuels was approved at a time 
when the Second World War was entering its final phase. Germany’s defeat left 
ENCASO without suppliers of the equipment and technology, and forced the 
company to overhaul the entire project. The contracts with the German 
companies were cancelled, although only a part of the payments made could 
be recovered. In the case of Lurgi, ENCASO had to pay for the work done at 
the design stages. The most serious problem, however, was the end of the 
connection with I.G. Farben, the company that possessed the licences for 
hydrogenation, technically the most complex part of the process. 
 
 In the following years, ENCASO sought new suppliers to keep the project 
alive. In late 1946 the company signed a new contract with the British company 
Woodall Duckman and its representatives in continental Europe for technical 
advice, design and the granting of licences for the construction of three 
batteries of furnaces for shale distillation. A few years before the British 
company had built distillation facilities for Scottish Oil in Westwood. The 
furnaces were to be Pumpherston. The designs provided by Lurgi (which 
ENCASO had paid for) were abandoned18. 
 
 Although there was still no solution to the basic problem of the treatment 
of the shale oil, the company was determined to continue the construction of 
the remaining sections of the plant. However, the work was held up by the 
problems that plagued Spain in the late 1940s – the blockade imposed by the 
victors of the Second World War, and the lack of foreign currency.  Iron, 
cement and copper were rationed, and often ENCASO did not even obtain the 
quantities to which it was officially entitled. The importing of machinery was 
continually hampered by the restrictions imposed by the Allies and the lack of 
foreign currency. In 1947 and 1948 the work on the plants practically came to a 
standstill.  
 
Spain’s external relations slowly improved, and by 1949 some contact 
with foreign countries had resumed. ENCASO remained set on its initial project, 
and German firms were the only ones that had commercially developed the 
processes of hydrogenation and synthesis which ENCASO needed to use. 
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ENCASO again contacted Lurgi, and BASF, which was under French control 
after I.G. Farben had been taken over and broken up by the Allies. In February 
1950 ENCASO signed a first contract with the two German companies for the 
design of a project, and for the presentation of a formal tender. A year later the 
definitive contract was signed for the construction of the oil treatment 
installations, including the hydrogenation plant. The overall budget was 7.6 
million dollars; an annual payment of 60 000 dollars was required to cover the 
licence transfer19.  
 
 Although the contracts had now been signed, the construction of the 
plant was still affected by the lack of foreign currency and a series of technical 
difficulties. The shale distillation batteries,  bought in 1946, were beset by 
problems and did not function regularly until 1955.  The installations for the 
treatment of shale oil were also completed in 1955, but their adjustment and 
testing went on for two more years. The factory only  reached normal levels of 
production in 1957 – fifteen years after the foundation of the company, and ten 
years behind schedule20.  
 
 Meanwhile, the company tried to secure the supply of the raw materials it 
needed. The most important shale mines had belonged to the Sociedad Minera 
and Metalúrgica de Peñarroya, a French company, since before the Civil War. 
ENCASO only possessed some relatively small concessions. In 1950 it 
obtained the right to exploit the concessions that belonged to Peñarroya, but 
only after the French company had extracted the layer of coal on top of the 
layer of shale. In these conditions, the supply of shale was not sufficient to keep 
the installations functioning, and the company had to use petroleum fractions 
that were brought by rail from Huelva (more than 370 miles away). As much as 
35 percent of the oil treated at the hydrogenation plant came from this source.  
 
 So the project took an extremely long time to set in motion; it was 
plagued with   difficulties at every turn. Ironically, the improvement in Spain’s 
foreign relations which made the project feasible also raised serious doubts 
about its usefulness. The severe restrictions on the importation of petroleum 
and petroleum products which had justified the project’s existence in the 1940s 
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were gradually disappearing. The consumption of petroleum products rose from 
0.5 million tonnes in 1945 to 3.9 million tonnes in 1957. In the meantime, other 
countries that had  studied the commercial viability of the production of 
synthetic fuels were now abandoning the enterprise. In the United States, for 
example, the evidence that the cost of these fuels was much higher than those 
derived from petroleum led to a progressive reduction in the aid granted by the 
State for experimentation, and the plants in Louisiana and Colorado were 
closed down in 1954 and 1956 respectively21. In Germany itself, the companies 
that had provided ENCASO with the technology for synthetic production were 
now returning to conventional petrochemicals22. The leaders of the INI could 
claim that the process underway in Puertollano was ‘the only one of its kind in 
the world'23 – indeed it was, but only because it lacked any financial 
justification. 
 
 Naturally, the INI and the heads of ENCASO were well aware that there 
was little economic justification  for continuing the project in the 1950s. The 
decision to do so should be understood in the context of the political situation of 
the time. Inside the structure of the State, the INI had wide-ranging autonomy, 
due in part to the personality of its president, J.A. Suanzes, and the fact that he 
had direct access to Franco. Suanzes, who had been minister of industry in 
1938-39, took up this post again from 1945 to 1951, without giving up the 
presidency of the INI. His successor at the ministry from 1951 to 1962 was 
Joaquín Planell, vicepresident of the INI and president of ENCASO, who also 
held these posts until 1957. So the industrial policy of the State was in the 
hands of INI men until 1962. This explains why emblematic projects of the INI 
were allowed to continue despite the evidence that there was no financial 
justification for them. Finally, under Franco’s dictatorship the economic 
decisions taken by the government were not discussed – not even in 
parliament, whose members were hand-picked by the government itself. 
 
 
3. The cost of a dream 
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 The investment made in the extraction and treatment of shales in 
Puertollano was far higher than had initially been expected. As table 1 shows, 
spending surpassed the budget set out in the 1944 Plan by some 45 percent. 
The increase was due in particular to the need to build auxiliary installations 
that had not been foreseen in the original plans. It is interesting to note that the 
final cost of 2.278 bn pesetas (about $80 million) more than 40 percent was 
spent abroad. This is a significant detail, because one of the project’s 
objectives was precisely to save on foreign currency expenditure. Furthermore, 
this foreign currency was spent when the Spanish economy had very little at its 
disposal, and the savings that the project produced in the shape of import 
substitution of petroleum products only materialized when the situation was far 
less severe. 
  
 The funds required for the investment came from the INI itself, the 
group’s parent company. In turn, until 1957 the INI obtained its resources 
mainly from the State’s general budgets, via public debt  issued specifically to 
finance the INI’s activities. From 1957 onwards the funding system changed 
and the INI now issued its own bonds. In any event, these bonds were 
considered public debt in the compulsory investments quotas imposed by the 
State on banks and savings banks24. Table 2 shows the amount and the origins 
of the resources obtained by the INI in those years. Everything suggests that, in 
spite of the limitations that the INI encountered in its attempts to fund its 
projects, ENCASO was always a priority for the holding and was not affected by 
budgetary problems.  
 
 The production achieved between 1956, when the tests began, and 
1965, the last full year of operation, is shown in table 3. As can be seen, in the 
years of normal functioning around 800.000 t. of shale was extracted, and 
around 50-55 million t. of lubricants and 40-45 million t. of fuels were obtained. 
The production of solvents and paraffins was much more variable. The yield on 
the distillation phase of the shales was around 8.4 t. of shale oil per 100 tonnes 
treated, similar to that of the shales of Colorado25. The main object of 
hydrogenation was to obtain lubricants. Most of the fuels obtained were gas 
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oils; the gasoline obtained was low quality and was used for mixtures. Most of 
the other products were solvents and paraffins.  
 
 Once the factory was functioning normally, the main problem facing 
ENCASO was, of course, the commercialization of its products. To put the 
question in context, first we should say something about the peculiar structure 
of the Spanish fuel market. The commercialization of fuels was subject to a 
State monopoly, set up in 1927 by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in order to 
increase the State’s income. The monopoly was managed by a privately owned 
company – CAMPSA – closely supervised by the ministry of finance. The 
standard retail price was set by the government, leaving a broad margin for the 
amount of tax corresponding to the State. CAMPSA received a proportion of 
this margin in return for managing the monopoly. ENCASO’s products had to be 
sold to CAMPSA, and so the main question was the price that the public 
monopoly was prepared to pay for them. The problem had a political side to it; 
the monopoly was controlled by the ministry of finance, but ENCASO and the 
INI depended on the ministry of industry26.  
 
 The debate on prices began in 1955. A technical committee was set up 
with representatives of the various companies involved.  A report  was prepared 
for presentation to the political authorities. From this report it was clear that 
ENCASO’s synthetic fuels cost 80 percent more than imported fuels (table 4). 
The total cost to the monopoly of purchasing ENCASO’s products depended on 
the distribution of the types of product, and on the evolution of  demand. In a 
stable scenario, CAMPSA calculated that this cost could amount to 263.6 
million pesetas a year. The figures for the main products are shown in table 4. 
ENCASO, on the other hand, assumed a higher demand for products with a 
higher tax margin, and estimated the annual cost to be 125.7 million pesetas. If 
the retail price was not changed, this cost would mean a reduction in the State’s 
income. The quantities were very large: the total income of the State from the 
fuel monopoly was around 600 million pesetas per year. Naturally, this increase 
in the purchase price also had to affect CAMPSA’s income.  
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Not surprisingly, both the company in charge of the monopoly and the 
ministry of finance itself were disturbed. The country’s economic and fiscal 
situation was extremely precarious and any reduction in the State’s income was 
a matter for deep concern. The INI and ENCASO, on the other hand, insisted 
that the State should cover the costs. Their arguments were simple. The 
company was entitled to “impose the consumption of its products", for three 
reasons: it used domestic raw materials, it was the property of the State and 
the imposition was required in order to make the company economically 
viable27. The tautology was evident. Once the decision to go ahead with the 
project had been taken, any losses that the functioning of the installations might 
incur had to be covered by the State.   
 
The debate continued in the following months and was only settled when 
the tax system as a whole was changed. In December 1956 it was agreed to 
eliminate certain direct taxes on road transport; in exchange, it was decided to 
increase the sales margin on petroleum products. The resulting increase in the 
retail price grew even greater in earlier 1957 in a package of measures aimed 
at containing the public deficit28.  
 
 Against this background, the government decided to solve the problem of 
the prices of ENCASO’s products. By order of the Presidency of the 
Government dated 12 June 1957 a new system for the commercialization of 
lubricating oils and similar products was implemented. This system established 
an order of seniority for the suppliers of lubricants, and criteria for fixing 
purchase prices, leaving approval to the Council of Ministers. The first supplier 
to put its products on sale would be ENCASO; the second would be REPESA 
(the INI’s conventional petroleum refinery); third would be CEPSA (Spain’s only 
private refinery) and finally, lubricants imported by CAMPSA or by authorized 
private traders. The State expected to corner the market, as ENCASO and 
REPESA together would meet all domestic demand. However, the new 
regulations accepted the possibility of authorizing the importation of lubricants 
not manufactured in Spain in special circumstances. In any event the system 
was extremely restrictive, and was fiercely protective of the interests of Spanish 
producers.  
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 As far as prices were concerned, a clear criterion was established: 
 
"CAMPSA’s purchase prices of the products obtained by Spanish 
refineries will be established taking into account that the profits of 
the refineries will permit, after the standard depreciations, the 
establishment of a maintenance fund for the plants in order to 
provide the highest levels of efficiency that technical advances 
permit... and the payment of a dividend of the same amount that 
CAMPSA paid to its shareholders" (Art. 14).  
 
 The pretensions of ENCASO and the INI were more than satisfied. The 
company could  "impose" its products on consumers and would obtain prices 
that not only covered costs, but would allow the absorption of future 
technological improvements. They were also assured of a good return, since 
CAMPSA was one of the companies with the highest dividends in Spain 
(around 8 percent per year).  
 
 The most worrying innovation in the new regulations as far the INI was 
concerned was also to be found in article 14. It established that the prices of 
lubricants that CAMPSA bought were to be approved by the Council of 
Ministers. This was particularly unattractive to the leaders of the INI because it 
meant that every year they would have to justify the enormous differences in 
cost between the synthetic products manufactured by ENCASO and the ones 
imported or produced by conventional refineries in Spain. A few years later, the 
president of the INI, J.A. Suanzes, said, '...this draws attention to the 
differences in cost between the lubricants imported from abroad and the 
products of REPESA, CEPSA and ENCASO, circumstances which give rise to 
comments, comparisons and finally to the proposal of solutions, some 
reasonable, some not, forgetting … the spirit which led the Government and the 
Cortes... to decide to establish the industry’29. So the regulations adopted by 
the Government in 1957 made possible the functioning of the Puertollano plant 
and made ENCASO economically viable, but, in turn, imposed procedures of 
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supervision that constantly drew attention to the incongruity of the situation and 
prompted proposals aimed at rectifying it, even inside the Government itself.  
 
Unfortunately for  ENCASO, the start of the production of synthetic fuels 
coincided with a major change in the regime’s economic policy, and with a shift 
in the balance of power among the forces that supported it. The timid economic 
liberalization initiated at  the beginning of the 1950s permitted healthy growth 
but seriously aggravated the external imbalance of the Spanish economy. By 
the end of the decade the situation had become untenable, with the imminent 
risk of suspension of foreign payments. In February 1957 Franco appointed a 
new government and placed members of Opus Dei in the most important 
economic ministries30. The government embarked on a process of reforms, 
culminating in the adoption of the Stabilization Plan of July 1959. Essentially, 
the Plan was a strong fiscal and monetary adjustment, accompanied by a 
gradual liberalization of domestic markets, a reduction of protectionist 
measures and the encouragement of foreign investment31. Clearly, the tide was 
turning against the ideas of autarky and State intervention that had launched 
the Puertollano project.  
 
The change in economic climate obliged the INI to seek alternatives for 
the industrial complex in Puertollano. In 1957 an internal study was set up to 
examine the possibility of establishing a conventional petroleum refinery there 
to provide fuels for the central area of Spain and also raw materials for a set of 
petrochemical plants that would expand the existing installations. Initially no 
mention was made of any link between this project and the future of the 
synthetic fuels plant. However, in the official report presented to the 
government in June 1961 the matter was discussed openly:  
 
‘It should not be forgotten that, even if the principal objective and the 
economic justification of the expansion... proposed... is to provide 
petroleum products for the centre of Spain..., there is another objective 
which could be considered secondary, in spite of its undoubted 
economic and political importance. This is the adaptation of the current 
installations in Puertollano... to the current circumstances and to those 
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likely to arise in the future... It is well known that obtaining liquid fuels 
and lubricants from shales is economically less advantageous than doing 
so from petroleum...32.  
 
The report proposed the gradual closure of the synthetic fuels plant and 
was approved by the government in August 1961. A year later, in August 1962, 
the World Bank published a long, detailed report on the Spanish economy, 
which was to have a decisive influence on consolidating the economic policy 
changes launched by the Stabilization Plan. As well as supporting the policy of 
opening up to the international economy and reducing tariffs, the report was 
particularly critical of the State-owned firms, and above all of the INI, saying that 
its unsupervised development seriously undermined the prospects of private 
enterprise and that the State’s participation in business should be strictly 
limited; public and private companies should be put on an equal footing. These 
recommendations affected every aspect of the INI’s role, and in particular the 
activities of ENCASO33. Without protection or privileges, the production of 
synthetic fuels could no longer be sustained. In time, the change in industrial 
policy and in the role of the INI inevitably led to the dismissal of those in charge. 
In July 1962 Joaquín Planell was replaced as minister of industry, and in 
October 1963 Franco accepted J.A. Suanzes’ resignation as president of the 
INI.  
 
 The Puertollano refinery developed slowly, only beginning to function 
around mid-1966. Immediately afterwards all the installations used in the 
treatment of shales were closed: the mines, the batteries of distillation and the 
hydrogenation plant. The products obtained in the new refinery were sold to 
CAMPSA at normal prices. However, for a few months the company managed 
to retain the right to charge the earlier prices in order  to cover the remaining 
costs of installation. In its 1966 report, the company stated, not without a 
certain regret, that the closing of the synthetic fuels plant was due to a decision 
taken by the government on economic grounds, 'not because the system had 
failed, or because it produced low quality materials”34.  
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4. State-owned firms and economic adventurism under a dictatorship. 
Some concluding remarks  
 
  The story of the Spanish synthetic fuels program may be illustrative of 
the role of State- owned firms in countries without democratic institutions. The 
representatives of the new political system set up after the Spanish civil war 
were dazzled by technical and political achievements of the Nazis. Under the 
pressure of the allied blockade, the possibility of securing a certain economic 
and political freedom through the production of fuels from domestic raw 
materials was very attractive. The objective, however, would not be achieved by 
the methods used in Nazi Germany, where the government encouraged the 
production of synthetic fuels through guaranteed prices and direct subsidies. In 
Spain, the authorities decided to set up a new firm under the control of a State-
owned industrial holding, the INI. This firm, ENCASO, was a symbol of the new 
policy that gave priority to economic independence over economic common 
sense. For more than fourteen years ENCASO was the INI’s largest single 
investment. 
 
 The fact that the project was built around the creation of a State-owned 
firm had serious consequences for its development. The defeat of Nazi 
Germany delayed the project in its early stages, and later on economic and 
technical difficulties played havoc with its progress. So by the time the first 
important contracts for the acquisition of equipment abroad were signed, the 
state of emergency in which the project had been launched had already 
passed. But the firm and the INI went ahead with the project, regardless of the 
high costs it involved. The institutional context in which the project developed 
played a large part; the promoters of the project were influential members of 
Franco’s governments who were able to impose their will in spite of the 
reluctance of other authorities.  
 
This would not have been the case if the project had been discussed in 
public and in a context of political freedom. Equally, if the project had involved 
private companies and had not been run by a state owned company, those in 
charge would have demanded greater guarantees from the State before 
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making an investment of this size. Such guarantees could only have been 
granted with the agreement of the heads of various areas of the government, 
and this consensus would have been extremely unlikely given the diversity of 
opinions among the authorities on the role of the State in the economy and on 
the development of synthetic fuels. ENCASO built its plant without an explicit, 
approved price system and with no guarantee that its products would be 
purchased by the company in charge of the fuel monopoly, but it was able to 
finance its investments because of the privileges that the INI enjoyed. The fact 
that it was a public company meant that its managers could act with a greater 
degree of freedom (or impunity).  
 
 In short, the case of synthetic fuel production in Spain shows that the 
coincidence of state ownership and the absence of democratic controls may 
encourage economic adventurism and have serious consequences for a 
country's economic development. The case also illustrates the economic 
malpractices of Franco’s regime – malpractices which had a disastrous effect 
on the conditions of every-day life in Spain. The Spanish people, living in a 
country already devastated by a long civil war and overwhelmed by the 
absence of political freedom, paid a high price for the interventionism and 
economic irresponsibility of the dictatorship. 
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Table 1. ENCASO investment at Puertollano (million PTA at 1951 prices) 
 
 
 
 Estimate investment Final investment 1957 
      
 1944 
Plan 
1951 
Revision Total 
Spanish 
supplies 
Foreign 
supplies 
Mines 28.5 99.8 134.1 48.2 85.9 
Distillation 
1,260.0 
274.4 286.8 160.9 125.9 
Oil treatment 825.1 915.3 369.9 545.4 
Power station 197.0 233.8 233.8 106.6 127.2 
Water supply 51.6 75.0 84.6 84.4 0.2 
Workers village 35.3 50.0 109.6 109.6  
Auxiliary services  156.3 196.7 166.0 30.7 
Land  57.4 139.4 75.7 63.7 
Other  131.0 178.2 178.2  
Total synthetic fuels 1,572.3 1,902.8 2,278.5 1,299.5 979.0 
      
Fertilizers plant 325.6 313.3 431.2 200.8 230.4 
Sulphuric plant   82.7 44.5 38.2 
      
Total Puertollano 1,897.9 2,216.1 2,792.4 1,544.8 1,247.6 
 
Source. “Revisión del reformado del Plan”, INIA, Leg. 311.3 Economía y finanzas 1958, exp. 
219. 
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Table 2. INI financing and investment in ENCASO (million PTA) 
 
 
 1946 1950 1957 1963 
     
State contribution 854.1 3,450.0 25,809.9 25,804.6 
- public debt  2,413.7 24,129.4 24,129.4 
- other 854.1 1,036.3 1,680.5 1,675.2 
     
Self-financing 8.7 103.1 857.4 3,332.7 
     
Outside resources 3.9 207.3 4,890.9 49,016.0 
- bonds    35,289.2 
- Bank of Spain  160.0 4,660.0 11,115.0 
- Other 3.9 47.3 230.9 2,611.8 
     
Total 866.7 3,760.4 31,558.2 78,153.3 
     
     
Investment in 
ENCASO 
246.9 1,027.0 4,702.4 7,185.1 
- capital 182.0 1,000.0 4,619.7 5,000.0 
- credit  64.9 27.0 82.7 2,185.1 
     
 
Source: Pablo Martín Aceña and Francisco Comín, INI, 50 años de industrialización en España 
(Madrid, 1991), p. 269; and ENCASO reports.
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Table 3. Production of Puertollano synthetic fuels plant 
 
 Oil shale Fuels Lubricants Paraffin Other 
 000’ t. 000’ m3 000’ t. 000’ t. 000’ t. 
      
1952 103,7     
1953 193,2     
1954 237     
1955 497,9     
1956 597,8 46,7 17,1 6,9  
1957 739,9 57,1 27,2 3,1 4,5 
1958 773,1 68,1 50,3 4,4 16,5 
1959 844,8 41,1 54 6 19,6 
1960 832,5 39,1 38 7,1 18,9 
1961 856,4 45,7 53,9 5,3 27 
1962 730,6 41,1 56,9 1,7 25,1 
1963 811,4 45,1 54,9 3,1 38,2 
1964 712,4 46,9 67,7 4,4 42,2 
1965 630,2 53,3 83,2 3,6 50,4 
1966 224,1     
      
 
Source: ENCASO Memorias. 
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Table 4. Cost differences between ENCASO and imported products 
 
      
 Imported 
(c.i.f.) ENCASO 
differenc
e 
Annual 
production 
Annual 
total cost 
 PTA/k. PTA/k. PTA/k. t. 000’ PTA 
Lubricants      
      
A 2.05 4.10 2.05 6,780 13,899 
C 2.22 4.30 2.08 3,830 7,966 
H-4 4.01 7.67 3.66 300 1,098 
H-7 4.01 11.01 7.00 500 3,500 
K 1.16 3.49 2.33 800 1,864 
J 2.22 5.00 2.78 300 834 
L 3.50 6.33 2.83 5,700 16,131 
SAE-EG 2.43 8.36 5.93 10,720 63,570 
SAE-EM 10.70 16.15 5.45 10,720 58,424 
SAE7-H-D 10.70 17.16 6.46 4,680 30,233 
SAE-MG 10.70 18.17 7.47 680 5,080 
      
Weighted total 5.45 9.95 4.50 45,010 202,598 
      
      
Fuels      
 PTA/l. PTA/l. PTA/l. 000’ litres  
Gasoline 1.04 1.40 0.36 6,120 2,203 
Diesel oil for 
agriculture 
0.90 2.17 1.27 11,498 14,556 
Diesel oil 0.88 1.62 0.74 53,166 39,173 
      
Weighted total 0.90 1.69 0.79 70,784 55.932 
      
Other products     5,053 
      
 Total cost  263,583 
 
 
Source: “Propuesta sobre producción, distribución y consumo de lubricantes y parafinas”, INIA, 
Leg. 220.0  Varios de combustibles sintéticos 1956, exp. 7.
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